THE HEEDLESSNESS OF THE LEADERS of the Reich's foreign policy when it came to establishing basic principles for an expedient alliance policy was not only continued after the revolution but was even exceeded. For if before the War general confusion of political concepts could be regarded as the cause of our faulty leadership in foreign policy, after the War it was a lack of honorable intentions. It was natural that the circles who saw their destructive aims finally achieved by the revolution could possess no interest in an alliance policy whose final result would inevitably be the re-establishment of a free German state. Not only that such a development would have run counter to the inner sense of the November crime, not only that it would have interrupted or actually ended the internationalization of the German economy: but also the domestic political effects resulting from a victorious fight for freedom in the field of foreign policy would in the future have meant doom for the present holders of power in the Reich. For the resurrection of a nation is not conceivable without its preceding nationalization, as, conversely, every great success in the sphere of foreign affairs inevitably produces reactions in the same direction. Every fight for freedom, as experience shows, leads to an intensification of national sentiment, of self-reliance, and hence also to a sharper sensibility toward anti-national elements and tendencies. Conditions and persons who are tolerated in peaceable times, who often, in fact, pass unnoticed, are not only rebuffed in times of seething national enthusiasm, but encounter a resistance that is not seldom fatal to them. Just recall, for example, the general fear of spies which at the outbreak of wars suddenly bursts forth in the fever heat of human passions and leads to the most brutal, sometimes even unjust persecutions, though everyone might tell himself that the danger of spies will be greater in the long years of a peaceful period, even though, for obvious reasons, it does not receive general attention to the same extent.
For this reason alone the subtle instinct of the government parasites washed to the surface by the November events senses that an uprising of our people for freedom, supported by an intelligent alliance policy and the resultant outburst of national passions, would mean the possible end of their own criminal existence.
Thus, it becomes understandable why the government authorities in power since 1918 have failed us in the field of foreign affairs and why the leaders of the state have almost always worked systematically against the real interests of the German nation. For what at first sight might appear planless is revealed on closer examination as merely the logical continuation of the road which the November revolution for the first time openly trod.
Here, to be sure, we must distinguish between the responsible or rather 'should-be-responsible' leaders of our state affairs, the average parliamentary politicasters, and the great stupid sheep's herd of patient lamblike people.
The first know what they want. The others play along, either because they know it or are too cowardly to ruthlessly oppose what they have recognized and felt to be harmful. And the others submit from incomprehension and stupidity.
As long as the National Socialist German Workers' Party possessed only the scope of a small and little known club, problems of foreign policy could possess only a subordinate importance in the eyes of many adherents. This especially because our movement in particular has always upheld and must always uphold the conception that external freedom comes neither as a gift from heaven nor from earthly powers, but can only be the fruit of development of inner strength. Only the elimination of the causes of our collapse, as well as the destruction of its beneficiaries can create the premise for our outward fight for freedom.
And so it is understandable if, due to such considerations, in the first period of the young movement the value of questions of foreign policy was set below the importance of its domestic reform plans.
But once the limits of the small, insignificant club were broadened and finally broken, and the young formation obtained the importance of a big organization, the necessity arose of taking a position on the questions pertaining to the developments in foreign affairs. It became necessary to lay down guiding principles which would not only not contradict the fundamental view of our world concept, but actually represent an emanation of this line of thought.
Precisely from our people's lack of schooling in foreign affairs, there results for the young movement an obligation to transmit to the individual leaders as well as the great masses through broad guiding principles a line of thought in matters of foreign policy, which is the premise for any practical execution in the future of the preparations in the field of foreign policy for the work of recovering the freedom of our people as well as a real sovereignty of the Reich.
The essential fundamental and guiding principle, which we must always bear in mind in judging this question, is that foreign policy is only a means to an end, and that the end is solely the promotion of our own nationality. No consideration of foreign policy can proceed from any other criterion than this: Does it benefit our nationality now or in the future, or will it be injurious to it?
This is the sole preconceived opinion permissible in dealing with this question. Partisan, religious humanitarian, and all other criteria in general, are completely irrelevant.
If before the War the task of a German foreign policy was to safeguard the sustenance of our people and its children on this globe by the preparation of the roads that can lead to this goal, as well as the winning of the necessary helpers in the form of expedient allies, today it is the same, with the single difference: Before the War, it was a question of helping to preserve the German nationality, taking into account the existing strength of the independent power state, today it is necessary first to restore to the nation its strength in the form of a free power state, which is the premise for the subsequent implementation of a practical foreign policy which will preserve, promote, and sustain our people for the future.
In other words: The aim of a German foreign policy of today must be the preparation for the reconquest of freedom for tomorrow.
And here a fundamental principle must always be kept in mind: The possibility of regaining independence for a nationality is not absolutely bound up with the integrity of a state territory, but rather with the existence of a remnant, even though small, of this people and state, which, in possession of the necessary freedom, not only can embody the spiritual community of the whole nationality, but also can prepare the military fight for freedom.
When a nation of a hundred million people, in order to preserve its state integrity, suffers the yoke of slavery in common; it is worse than if such a state and such a people had been shattered and only a part of them remained in possession of full freedom. On condition, to be sure, that this last remnant were filled with the holy mission of not only proclaiming its spiritual and cultural inseparability, but also of accomplishing the military preparation for the final liberation and reunion of the unfortunate oppressed portions.
It should further be borne in mind that the question of regaining lost sections of a people's and state's territory is always primarily a question of regaining the political power and independence of the mother country; that, therefore, in such a case the interests of lost territories must be ruthlessly subordinated to the interest of regaining the freedom of the main territory. For the liberation of oppressed, separated splinters of a nationality or of provinces of a country does not take place on the basis of a desire on the part of the oppressed people or of a protest on the part of those left behind, but through the implements of power of those remnants of the former common fatherland that are still more or less sovereign.
Therefore, the presupposition for the gaining of lost territories is the intensive promotion and strengthening of the remaining remnant state and the unshakable decision slumbering in the heart to dedicate the new force thus arising to the freedom and unification of the entire nationality in the proper hour: therefore, subordination of the interests of the separated territories to the single interest of winning for the remaining remnant that measure of political power and strength which is the precondition for a correction of the will of hostile victors. For oppressed territories are led back to the bosom of a common Reich, not by flaming protests, but by a mighty sword.
To forge this sword is the task of a country's internal political leadership; to safeguard the work of forging and seek comrades in arms is the function of diplomatic leadership.
In the first volume of this work I have discussed the halfheartedness of our alliance policy before the War. Of the four roads to a future preservation of our nationality and its sustenance, the fourth and least favorable was chosen. In place of a healthy European land policy, a colonial and commercial policy was chosen. This was all the more fallacious as it was thought that an armed settlement could in this way be avoided. The result of this attempt to sit on several chairs was the proverbial fall between them, and the World War was only the last reckoning submitted the Reich for its faulty conduct of foreign affairs.
The correct road would even then have been the third: a strengthening of our continental power by gaining new soil in Europe, and precisely this seemed to place a completion by later acquisitions of colonial territory within the realm of the naturally possible. This policy, to be sure, could only have been carried out in alliance with England or with so abnormal an emphasis on the military implements of power that for forty or fifty years cultural tasks would have been forced into the background. This would have been quite justifiable. The cultural importance of a nation is almost always bound up with its political freedom and independence; therefore, the latter is the presupposition for the existence, or, better, the establishment, of the former. Therefore, no sacrifice can be too great for the securing of political freedom. What general cultural matters lose through an excessive promotion of the state's implements of military power, it will later be possible to restore most abundantly. Yes, it may be said that, after such a concentrated exertion in the sole direction of preserving state independence, a certain relaxation or compensation customarily ensues in the form of a really amazing golden age of the hitherto neglected cultural forces of a nation. From the hardships of the Persian Wars arose the Age of Pericles, and through the cares of the Punic Wars the Roman state began to dedicate itself to the service of a higher culture.
To be sure, such a complete subordination of all a nation's other interests to the sole task of preparing a coming contest of arms for the future security of the state cannot be entrusted to the decision of a majority of parliamentary idiots or good-for-nothings. The father of a Frederick the Great was able to prepare for a contest of arms, disregarding all other concerns, but the fathers of our democratic parliamentary nonsense of the Jewish variety cannot do so.
For this very reason the military preparation for an acquisition of land and soil in Europe could be only a limited one, and the support of suitable allies could hardly be dispensed with.
Since, however, our leaders wanted to know nothing of a systematic preparation for war,. they renounced the acquisition of land in Europe and, by turning instead to a colonial and commercial policy, sacrificed the alliance with England which would otherwise have been possible, but did not, as would have been logical, seek the support of Russia, and finally, forsaken by all except the Habsburg hereditary evil, stumbled into the World War.
In characterizing our present foreign policy, it must be said that there exists no visible or even intelligible line. Before the War the fourth road was erroneously taken, and that pursued only by halves, while since the revolution no road at all has been discernible, even to the sharpest eye. Even more than before the War, any systematic thought is lacking, except perhaps an attempt to smash the last possibility of a resurrection of our people.
A cool appraisal of the present European relations of power leads to the following conclusion:
For three hundred years the history of our continent has been basically determined by the attempt of England to obtain the necessary protection in the rear for great British aims in world politics, indirectly through balanced, mutually interlocking relations of power.
The traditional tendency of British diplomacy, which in Germany can only be compared with the tradition of the Prussian army, was, since the efforts of Queen Elizabeth, directed solely toward preventing by all possible means the rise of any European great power above its place in the general hierarchy, and, if possible, to break it by military intervention. The instruments of power which England was accustomed to apply in this case varied according to the existing or presented task; but the determination and will power for using them were always the same. Indeed, the more difficult England's situation became in the course of time, the more necessary it seemed to the leaders of the British Empire to keep the individual state powers of Europe in a state of general paralysis resulting from mutual rivalries. The political separation of the former North American colonial territory led, in the ensuing period, to the greatest exertions to keep the European rear absolutely covered. And so - after the destruction of Spain and the Netherlands as great sea powers - the strength of the English was concentrated against aspiring France until finally, with the fall of Napoleon, the danger to England of this most dangerous military power's hegemony could be regarded as broken.
The shift of British policy against Germany was undertaken only slowly, not only because, due to the lack of a national unification of the German nation, a visible danger for England did not exist, but also because public opinion, prepared by propaganda for a particular political goal, is slow in following new aims. The sober knowledge of the statesman seems transposed into emotional values which are not only more fruitful in their momentary efficacy, but also more stable with regard to duration. Therefore the statesman, after achieving one purpose, can without further ado turn his thought processes toward new goals, but it will be possible to transform the masses emotionally into an instrument of their leader's new view only by slow propagandist efforts.
As early as 1870-71, England had meanwhile formulated her new position. Fluctuations which occurred at times, due to the importance of America in world economy as well as Russia's development as a political power, were unfortunately not utilized by Germany, so that a steady intensification of the original tendency in British statesmanship was bound to result.
England saw in Germany the power whose importance in commercial and hence in world politics, not least as a result of her enormous industrialization, was increasing to such a menacing extent that the strength of the two states in identical fields could already be balanced. The 'peaceful, economic' conquest of the world which to the helmsmen of our state seemed the highest emanation of the ultimate wisdom, became for the English politicians the ground for the organization of resistance against us. That this resistance assumed the form of a comprehensively organized attack was fully in keeping with the essence of a diplomacy whose aims did not lie in the preservation of a questionable world peace, but in the reinforcement of British world domination. That England used as allies all states which were in any way possible in the military sense was equally in keeping with her traditional caution in the estimation of the adversary's strength as with the appreciation of her own momentary weakness. This can, therefore, not be characterized as 'unscrupulousness,' because such a comprehensive organization of a war is to be judged by criteria, not of heroism, but of expediency. Diplomacy must see to it that a people does not heroically perish, but is practically preserved. Every road that leads to this is then expedient, and not taking it must be characterized as criminal neglect of duty.
With the revolutionization of Germany, the British concern over a threatening Germanic world hegemony found an end, to the relief of British statesmen.
Since then England has had no further interest in the complete effacement of Germany from the map of Europe. On the contrary, the terrible collapse which occurred in the November days of 1918 placed British diplomacy in a new situation which at first was not even considered possible.
For four and a half years the British world empire had fought in order to break the supposed preponderance of a continental power. Now suddenly a crash occurred which seemed to remove this power entirely from the picture. There was manifested such an absence of even the most primitive instinct of self-preservation that the European balance seemed thrown off its hinges by an action of scarcely forty-eight hours: Germany destroyed and France the first continental power of Europe.
The enormous propaganda which had made the British people persevere and hold out in this war, which recklessly incited them and stirred up all their deepest instincts and passions, now inevitably weighed like lead on the decisions of British statesmen. With the colonial, economic, and commercial destruction of Germany, the British war aim was achieved; anything beyond this was a curtailment of English interests. Through wiping out a German power state in continental Europe, only the enemies of England could gain. Nevertheless, in the November days of 1918 and up to midsummer of 1919, a reorientation of English diplomacy, which in this long war more than ever before had used up the emotional powers of the great masses, was no longer possible. It was not possible from the viewpoint of the existing attitude of their own people, and was not possible in view of the disposition of the military relation of forces. France had seized upon the law of action and could dictate to the others. The single power, however, which in these months of haggling and bargaining might have brought about a change, Germany herself, lay in the convulsions of inner civil war and only kept on proclaiming, through the mouth of her so-called statesmen, her readiness to accept any dictate whatsoever.
Now, if in the life of peoples, a nation, in consequence of its total lack of an instinct of self-preservation, ceases to be a possible 'active' ally, she customarily sinks to the level of a slave nation and her land succumbs to the fate of a colony.
Precisely to prevent France's power from becoming excessive, a participation of England in her predatory lusts was the sole possible form for England herself.
Actually England did not achieve her war aim. The rise of a European power above the relations of forces of the continental state system of Europe was not only not prevented but was given increased support.
In 1914, Germany as a military state was wedged in between two countries one of which disposed of an equal power and the other of a superior power. On top of this came the superior sea power of England; France and Russia alone offered obstacles and resistance to every disproportionate development of German greatness. The extremely unfavorable situation of the Reich from the viewpoint of military geography could be considered a further coefficient of security against an excessive increase in the power of this country. The coastline especially was unfavorable from the military standpoint for a fight with England; it was short and cramped, and the land front, on the other hand, disproportionately long and open.
The situation of France today is different: the first military power, without a serious rival on the continent; on her southern borders, as good as guaranteed against Spain and Italy; secured against Germany by the feebleness of the fatherland; her coastline on a long front poised directly opposite the vital nerves of the British Empire. Not only for airplanes and long-distance batteries do the English vital centers constitute worth-while targets, but also her trade lanes are exposed to the effects of submarine warfare. A submarine campaign, based on the long Atlantic coast and the equally long stretches of the French border territories of the Mediterranean in Europe and North Africa, would be devastating in effect.
Thus, the fruit of the struggle against the development of Germany's power was politically to bring about French hegemony on the continent. The military result: the reinforcement of France as the first prime power on land and the recognition of the Union as an equal sea power. Economically: the surrender of immense spheres of British interest to former allies.
Just as England's traditional political aims desire and necessitate a certain Balkanization of Europe, those of France necessitate a Balkanization of Germany.
England's desire is and remains the prevention of the rise of a continental power to world-political importance; that is, the maintenance of a certain balance of power between the European states; for this seems the presupposition of a British world hegemony.
France's desire is and remains to prevent the formation of a unified power in Germany, the maintenance of a system of German petty states with balanced power relations and without unified leadership, and occupation of the left bank of the Rhine as the presupposition for creating and safeguarding her position of hegemony in Europe.
The ultimate aim of French diplomacy will always stand in conflict with the ultimate tendency of British statesmanship.
Anyone who undertakes an examination of the present alliance possibilities for Germany from the above standpoint must arrive at the conclusion that the last practicable tie remains with England. Terrible as the consequences of the English war policy were and are for Germany, we must not close our eyes to the fact that a necessary interest on the part of England in the annihilation of Germany no longer exists today; that, on the contrary, England's policy from year to year must be directed more and more to an obstruction of France's unlimited drive for hegemony. An alliance policy is not conducted from the standpoint of retrospective grudges, but is fructified by the knowledge of retrospective experience. And experience should have taught us that alliances for the achievement of negative aims languish from inner weakness. National destinies are firmly forged together only by the prospect of a common success in the sense of common gains, conquests; in short, of a mutual extension of power.
How feebly our people think in terms of foreign policy can be seen most clearly from the current press reports with regard to the greater or lesser 'friendliness to Germany' of this or that foreign statesman; such reports see a special guaranty of a benevolent policy toward our nationality in this supposed attitude on the part of such personalities. This is an utterly incredible absurdity, a speculation on the unparalleled simplicity of the average German shopkeeper dabbling in politics. No English or American or Italian statesman was ever 'pro-German.' As a statesman, every Englishman will naturally be even more of an Englishman, every American an American, and no Italian will be found ready to pursue any other policy than a pro-Italian one. Therefore, anyone who thinks he can base alliances with foreign nations on a pro-German orientation of their leading statesmen is either an ass or a hypocrite. The premise for the linking of national destinies is never based on mutual respect, let alone affection, but on the prospect of expediency for both contracting parties. In other words: true as it is that an English statesman will always pursue a pro-English policy and never a pro-German one, certain definite interests of this pro-English policy may for the most varying reasons coincide with pro-German interests. This, of course, need only be the case up to a certain degree and can some day shift to the exact opposite; but the skill of a leading statesman is manifested precisely in always finding at specified periods those partners for the achievement of their own needs, who must go the same road in pursuit of their own interests.
The practical moral of all this for the present can result only from the answer to the following questions: What states at the present time have no vital interest in having the French economic and military power achieve a position of dominant hegemony in Europe by the total exclusion of a German Central Europe? Yes, which states on the basis of their own requirements for existence and their previous political tradition see a threat to their own future in such a development?
For on this point we must at length achieve full clarity: The inexorable mortal enemy of the German people is and remains France It matters not at all who ruled or will rule in France, whether Bourbons or Jacobins, Bonapartists or bourgeois democrats, Clerical republicans or Red Bolshevists: the final goal of their activity in foreign affairs will always be an attempt to seize possession of the Rhine border and to secure this watercourse for France by means of a dismembered and shattered Germany.
England desires no Germany as a world power, but wishes no power at all called Germany: quite an essential difference, after all Today we are not fighting for a position as a world power; today we must struggle for the existence of our fatherland, for the unity of our nation and the daily bread of our children. If we look about us for European allies from this standpoint, there remain only two states: England and Italy.
England does not want a France whose military fist, unobstructed by the rest of Europe, can undertake a policy which, one way or another, must one day cross English interests. England can never desire a France which, in possession of the immense Western European iron and coal deposits, obtains the foundations of a menacing economic world position. And England, furthermore, cannot desire a France whose continental political situation, thanks to the shattering of the rest of Europe, seems so assured that the resumption of a French world policy along broader lines is not only made possible but positively forced. The Zeppelin bombs of former times might multiply a thousandfold every night; the military preponderance of France presses heavy on the heart of Great Britain's world empire.
And Italy, too, cannot and will not desire a further reinforcement of the French position of superior power in Europe. Italy's future will always be conditioned by a development which is geographically grouped around the Mediterranean basin. What drove Italy into the war was really not the desire to aggrandize France, but the desire to give the hated Adriatic rival the death blow. Any further continental strengthening of France, however, is an obstacle to Italy in the future, and we must not delude ourselves that relations of parentage among nations can in any way exclude rivalries.
On soberest and coldest reflection, it is today primarily these two states, England and Italy, whose most natural selfish interests are not, in the most essential points at least, opposed to the German nation's requirements for existence, and are, indeed, to a certain extent, identified with them.
We must, to be sure, in judging such a possibility of alliance, not overlook three factors. The first depends on us, the two others on the states in question.
Can any nation ally itself with the present-day Germany? Can a power which seeks in an alliance an aid for carrying out offensive aims of its own, ally itself with a state whose leaders for years have offered a picture of the most wretched incompetence, of pacifistic cowardice, and the greater part of whose population, in democratic-Marxist blindness, betray the interests of their own nation and country in a way that cries to high Heaven? Can any power hope today to create a valuable relation with a state, in the hope of some day fighting in common for common interests, when this country obviously possesses neither the courage nor the desire to stir so much as a finger in defense of its own bare existence? Will any power, for which an alliance is and should be more than a treaty for the guaranty and maintenance of a state of slow putrefaction like the old Triple Alliance, obligate itself for weal or woe to a state whose characteristic way of life consists only in cringing submissiveness without and disgraceful oppression of national virtues within; with a state that no longer possesses any greatness, since on the basis of its whole behavior it no longer deserves it; with governments which can boast of no respect whatsoever on the part of their citizens, so that foreign countries cannot possibly harbour any greater admiration for them?
No, a power which itself wants to be respected and which hopes to gain more from alliances than fees for hungry parliamentarians will not ally itself with present-day Germany; indeed, it cannot. And in our present unfitness for alliance lies the deepest and ultimate ground for the solidarity of the enemy bandits. Since Germany never defends herself, except by a few flaming protests on the part of our parliamentary élite, and the rest of the world has no reason for fighting in our defence, and as a matter of principle God does not make cowardly nations free - notwithstanding the whimpering of our patriotic leagues to that effect - there remains nothing else even for the states which possess no direct interest in our total annihilation but to take part in France's campaigns of pillage, if only, by such cooperation and participation in the pillage, at least to prevent the exclusive strengthening of France alone.
Secondly, we must not overlook the difficulty in undertaking a reorientation of the great popular masses of the countries previously hostile to us, who have been influenced in a certain direction by mass propaganda. For it is not possible to represent a nationality as 'Huns,' 'robbers,' 'Vandals,' etc., over a period of years, only to discover the opposite suddenly overnight, and recommend the former enemy as the ally of tomorrow.
Yet even more attention must be given to a third fact which will be of essential importance for the shaping of the coming European alliance relations:
Little interest as England, from a British state viewpoint, may have in a further annihilation of Germany, that of the international stock exchange Jews in such a development is great. The cleavage between the official, or, better expressed, the traditional, British statesmanship and the controlling Jewish stock exchange powers is nowhere better shown than in their different position on the questions of British foreign policy. Jewish finance in opposition to the interests of the British state welfare desires not only the complete economic annihilation of Germany, but also her complete political enslavement. The inter nationalization of our German economy - that is, the appropriation of the German labour power by Jewish world finance - can be completely carried out only in a politically Bolshevist state. But if the Marxist shock troops of international Jewish stock exchange capital are to break the back of the German national state for good and all this can only be done with friendly aid from outside The armies of France must, therefore, besiege the German state structure until the Reich, inwardly exhausted, succumbs to the Bolshevistic shock troop of international Jewish world finance.
And so the Jew today is the great agitator for the complete destruction of Germany. Wherever in the world we read of attacks against Germany, Jews are their fabricators, just as in peacetime and during the War the press of the Jewish stock exchange and Marxists systematically stirred up hatred against Germany until state after state abandoned neutrality and, renouncing the true interests of the peoples, entered the service of the World War coalition.
The Jewish train of thought in all this is clear. The Bolshevization of Germany - that is, the extermination of the national folkish Jewish intelligentsia to make possible the sweating of the German working class under the yoke of Jewish world finance - is conceived only as a preliminary to the further extension of this Jewish tendency of world conquest. As often in history, Germany is the great pivot in the mighty struggle. If our people and our state become the victim of these bloodthirsty and avaricious Jewish tyrants of nations, the whole earth will sink into the snares of this octopus; if Germany frees herself from this embrace, this greatest of dangers to nations may be regarded as broken for the whole world.
Therefore, as surely as the Jews will bring their entire agitational efforts to bear, not only to maintain the hostility of the nations to Germany, but if possible to increase it even more, just as surely only a fraction of this activity coincides with the real interests of the peoples poisoned by it. In general, the Jews will always fight within the various national bodies with those weapons which on the basis of the recognized mentality of these nations seem most effective and promise the greatest success. In our national body, so torn with regard to blood, it is therefore the more or less 'cosmopolitan,' pacifistic-ideological ideas, arising from this fact; in short, the international tendencies which they utilize in their struggle for power: in France they work with the well-known and correctly estimated chauvinism; in England with economic and world-political considerations; in short, they always utilize the most essential qualities that characterize the mentality of a people. Only when in such a way they have achieved a certain profusion of economic and political influence and predominance do they strip off the fetters of these borrowed weapons, and display in exactly the same measure the true inner purposes of their will and their struggle. They now begin to destroy with ever-greater rapidity, until they have turned one state after another into a heap of rubble on which they can then establish the sovereignty of the eternal Jewish empire.
In England as well as Italy the cleavage between the views of the better indigenous statesmanship and the will of the world stock exchange Jews is clear; sometimes, indeed, it is crassly obvious.
Only in France does there exist today more than ever an inner unanimity between the intentions of the Jew-controlled stock exchange and the desire of the chauvinist-minded national statesmen. But in this very identity there lies an immense danger for Germany. For this very reason, France is and remains by far the most terrible enemy. This people, which is basically becoming more and more negrified, constitutes in its tie with the aims of Jewish world domination an enduring danger for the existence of the white race in Europe. For the contamination by Negro blood on the Rhine in the heart of Europe is just as much in keeping with the perverted sadistic thirst for vengeance of this hereditary enemy of our people as is the ice-cold calculation of the Jew thus to begin bastardizing the European continent at its core and to deprive the white race of the foundations for a sovereign existence through infection with lower humanity.
What France, spurred on by her own thirst for vengeance and systematically led by the Jew, is doing in Europe today is a sin against the existence of white humanity and some day will incite against this people all the avenging spirits of a race which has recognized racial pollution as the original sin of humanity.
For Germany, however, the French menace constitutes an obligation to subordinate all considerations of sentiment and hold out a hand to those who, threatened as much as we are, will neither suffer nor tolerate France's desires for domination.
In the predictable future there can be only two allies for Germany in Europe: England and Italy.
Anyone who takes the trouble to glance back and follow Germany's leadership in foreign policy since the revolution will, in view of the constant and incomprehensible failure of our governments, be unable to do otherwise than take his head in his hands, and either simply despair or, in flaming indignation, declare war on such a régime. These actions no longer have anything in common with lack of understanding: for what would have seemed unthinkable to any thinking brain has been done by these intellectual Cyclopses of our November parties: they have courted France's favour. Yes, indeed, in all these years, with the touching simplicity of incorrigible dreamers, they have tried again and again to make friends with France; over and over again they have bowed and scraped before the 'great nation'; in every shrewd trick of the French hangman they have felt justified in seeing the first sign of a visible change of attitude. Our real political wire-pullers, of course, never harboured this insane belief. For them currying favour with France was only the obvious means of sabotaging every practical alliance policy. They were never in doubt as to the aims of France and her men behind the scenes. What compelled them to act as if they nevertheless honestly believed in the possibility of a change in the fate of Germany was the sober realization that otherwise our people would take things into their own hands.
Even for us, of course, it is hard to represent England as a possible future ally in the ranks of our own movement. Again and again our Jewish press has known how to concentrate special hatred on England, and many a good German simpleton has fallen into the Jewish snare with the greatest willingness, drooled about 'strengthening' German sea power, protested against the rape of our colonies, recommended their reconquest, and thus helped furnish the material which the Jewish scoundrel could pass on to his fellow Jews in England for practical propagandist use. For it should gradually dawn even on our political bourgeois simpletons that what we have to fight for today is not 'sea power,' etc. The orientation of the German national strength toward this aim, without the most thoroughgoing previous securing of our position in Europe, was an absurdity even before the War. Today such a hope must be counted among those stupidities which in the field of politics are characterized as crimes.
Sometimes it was really maddening to be compelled to look on as the Jewish wire-pullers succeeded in occupying our people with things that are today of the most secondary nature, inciting them to demonstrations and protests, while at the same time France was tearing piece after piece out of the flesh of our national body, and the foundations of our independence were systematically taken away from us.
Here I must recall a special hobby which in these years the Jew rode with amazing adroitness: the South Tyrol.
Yes, the South Tyrol. If I here concern myself with this particular question, it is not least to settle accounts with that hypocritical rabble which, counting on the forgetfulness and stupidity of our broad strata, has the insolence to mimic on this point a national indignation, which is more alien especially to the parliamentary swindlers than honest conceptions of property to a magpie.
I would like to emphasize that I personally am among the men who, when the fate of the South Tyrol was being decided - that is, beginning in August, 1914, up to November, 1918 - went where this territory was being actively defended - I mean the army. In those years I did my part of the fighting, not in order that the South Tyrol should be lost, but in order that it should be preserved for the fatherland just like every other German province.
The ones who did not do their bit at that time were the parliamentary sneak-thieves, all the politics-playing party rabble. On the contrary, while we fought in the conviction that only a victorious issue to the War would preserve this South Tyrol for the German nationality, the big-mouths of these Ephialteses agitated and plotted against victory until at last the battling Siegfried succumbed to the treacherous dagger thrust. For the preservation of the South Tyrol in German possession was naturally not guaranteed by the lying inflammatory speeches of parliamentary sharpers on the Vienna Rathausplatz or in front of the Munich Feldherrnhalle, but only by the battalions at the fighting front. Those who broke this front betrayed the South Tyrol, just as they betrayed all other German territories.
And anyone who believes today that he can solve the South Tyrol question by protests, declarations, clubby parades, is either a very special scoundrel or a German petit bourgeois.
We must clearly recognize the fact that the recovery of the lost territories is not won through solemn appeals to the Lord or through pious hopes in a league of Nations, but only by force of arms.
And so the only question is, Who is ready to attempt the reconquest of these lost territories by defiant armed force?
As far as my person is concerned, I can here assure you with a clear conscience that I could still muster up enough courage to take part in the victorious conquest of the South Tyrol at the head of a parliamentary storm battalion that ought to be formed, consisting of parliamentary big-mouths and other party leaders plus various privy councillors. God knows it would give me pleasure if suddenly a few shrapnel would burst over the heads of such a 'flaming' protest demonstration. I think if a fox were to break into a chicken-coop the cackling could hardly be worse, or the rush of the feathered fowl for safety any quicker, than the flight of such a splendid 'protest rally.'
But the vile thing about the whole business is that the gentlemen themselves do not believe they can achieve anything in this way. They personally know, better than anyone else, the impossibility and innocuousness of all the fuss they are making. But they carry on as they do, because it is naturally somewhat easier to shoot off their mouths for the recovery of the South Tyrol today than it once was to fight for keeping it. Everyone does his own part; then we sacrificed our blood, and today this company sharpen their beaks.
It is especially delightful, moreover, to see how Viennese legitimist circles literally bristle with their present activity for regaining the South Tyrol. Seven years ago, to be sure, their noble and exalted ruling house helped by a scoundrelly deed of treacherous perjury to make it possible for the victorious world coalition to win among other things the South Tyrol. At that time these circles supported the policy of their treacherous dynasty, and didn't care a damn about the South Tyrol or anything else. Today, of course, it is easier to take up the struggle for these territories, for today, after all, it is fought only with 'spiritual weapons,' and it is always easier to talk your throat hoarse in some 'protest meeting' - from noble, heartfelt indignation - and wear your fingers to the bone writing a newspaper article than, say, to blow up bridges during the occupation of the Ruhr.
The reason why in the last few years certain definite circles have made the 'South Tyrol' question the pivotal point of German-Italian relations is obvious. Jews and Habsburg legitimists have the greatest interest in preventing a German alliance policy which might lead some day to the resurrection of a free German fatherland. All this fuss today is not made for love of the South Tyrol - which it does not help but only harms - but for fear of a possible German-Italian understanding.
It is quite in keeping with the general hypocrisy and slanderous tendencies of these circles when they attempt with cold and brazen gall to make things look as if we had 'betrayed' the South Tyrol.
To these gentlemen let it be said with all plainness: the South Tyrol was 'betrayed ' first and foremost by every German with sound limbs who in the years 1914-1918 did not stand somewhere at the front, putting his services at the disposal of the fatherland;
secondly, by every man who in those years did not help to strengthen our national body's power of resistance for the pursuit of the War and to fortify the endurance of our people for carrying through this fight to the end; thirdly, the South Tyrol was betrayed by every man who cooperated in the outbreak of the November revolution - whether directly by deed or indirectly by the cowardly toleration of the deed - and thereby smashed the weapon which alone could have saved the South Tyrol.
Yes, my brave lip-service protesters, that is how things stand !
Today I am guided only by the sober realization that lost territories are not won back by sharp parliamentary big-mouths and their glibness of tongue, but by a sharp sword; in other words, by a bloody fight.
But I do not hesitate to declare that, now the dice have fallen, I not only regard a reconquest of the South Tyrol by war as impossible, but that I personally would reject it in the conviction that for this question the flame of national enthusiasm of the whole German people could not be achieved to a degree which would offer the premise for victory. I believe, on the contrary, that, if this blood some day were staked, it would be a crime to stake it for two hundred thousand Germans while next door more than seven millions languish under foreign domination and the vital artery of the German people runs through the hunting ground of African Negro hordes.
If the German nation wants to end a state of affairs that threatens its extermination in Europe, it must not fall into the error of the pre-War period and make enemies of God and the world; it must recognize the most dangerous enemy and strike at him with all its concentrated power. And if this victory is obtained through sacrifices elsewhere, the coming generations of our people will not condemn us. The more brilliant the resultant successes, the better they will appreciate the dire distress and profound cares, and the bitter decision born of them.
What must guide us today is again and again the basic insight that the reconquest of a Reich's lost territories is primarily the question of regaining the political independence and power of the motherland.
To make this possible and sure by an astute alliance policy is the first task of a powerful German leadership in the field of foreign affairs.
Especially we National Socialists must guard against being taken in tow by the Jewish-led bourgeois patriots of the word. Heaven help us if our movement, instead of preparing for the struggle, were to spend its time in protests!
The fantastic conception of the Nibelungen alliance with the Habsburg state cadaver has been the ruin of Germany. Fantastic sentimentality in the treatment of today's diplomatic possibilities is the best means of preventing our resurrection forever.
Here I must briefly take up those objections which apply to the three questions raised above, to wit, the questions whether anyone will
first, make an alliance with the present-day Germany in her visible weakness that is clear for all to see; secondly, whether the enemy nations seem capable of such a reorientation and
thirdly, whether the existing influence of the Jews is not stronger than any understanding or good intentions and will thus frustrate and nullify all plans.
I think I have sufficiently discussed one half of the first question. Of course, no one will make an alliance with present-day Germany. No power in the world will venture to link its destiny to a state whose government is bound to destroy all confidence. And as regards the attempt of many of our national comrades to condone the government's actions because of the wretched mentality of our people at the time, and even accept this as an excuse, we must take the sharpest position against this.
It is true, the absence of character in our people for the last six years has been profoundly sad, their indifference toward the most important concerns of our nation has been truly crushing, their cowardice has sometimes cried out to high Heaven. But it must not be forgotten that we are nevertheless dealing with a people which a few years previous offered the world the most admirable example of the highest human virtues. From the August days of 1914 up to the end of the mighty conflict of nations, no people on earth revealed more manly courage, tenacious endurance, and patience in suffering than our German people which has today grown so wretched. No one will maintain that the disgrace of our present period is the characteristic expression of our nation's being. What we are compelled to experience around us and in us today is only the horrible, maddening, and infuriating influence of the perjuring deed of November 9, 1918. Here more than ever the poet's saying applies that evil begets evil. But even at the present time, our people has not entirely lost its good basic elements; they only are slumbering un-awakened in the depths; and from time to time it has been possible to see, gleaming like summer lightning in an overcast firmament, virtues which the future Germany will some day remember as the first signs of an incipient recovery. More than once, thousands and thousands of young Germans have stepped forward with the self-sacrificing resolve to sacrifice their young lives freely and joyfully on the altar of the beloved fatherland, just as in 1914. Again, millions of men are diligently and industriously at work, as though the ravages of the revolution had never been. The blacksmith stands again at his anvil, the peasant guides his plough, and the scholar sits in his study, all with the same painstaking devotion to duty.
The repressions on the part of our enemies no longer meet the same condoning laughter as formerly, but grieved, embittered faces. Undoubtedly a great change in sentiment has taken place.
If today all this is not yet expressed in a rebirth of our people's concept of political power and instinct of self-preservation, it is the fault of those who, less by the grace of Heaven than by self appointment, have governed our people to death since 1918.
Yes, if we bemoan the state of the nation today, we may ask: What has been done to improve it? Is the feeble support given by the people to the decisions of our governments - decisions which scarcely existed - only a sign of our nation's small vitality or is it not even more a sign of total failure in the handling of this precious treasure? What have our governments done to re-implant the spirit of proud self-reliance, manly defiance and wrathful hatred in this people?
When in the year 1919 the German people was burdened with the peace treaty, we should have been justified in hoping that precisely through this instrument of boundless repression the cry for German freedom would have been immensely promoted. Peace treaties whose demands are a scourge to nations not seldom strike the first roll of drums for the uprising to come.
What could have been done with this peace treaty of Versailles ?
This instrument of boundless extortion and abject humiliation might, in the hands of a willing government, have become an instrument for whipping up the national passions to fever heat. With a brilliant propagandist exploitation of these sadistic cruelties, the indifference of a people might have been raised to indignation, and indignation to blazing fury !
How could every single one of these points have been burned into the brain and emotion of this people, until finally in sixty million heads, in men and women, a common sense of shame and a common hatred would have become a single fiery sea of flame, from whose heat a will as hard as steel would have risen and a cry burst forth:
Give us arms again !
Yes, my friends, that is what such a peace treaty would do. In the boundlessness of its oppression, the shamelessness of its demands, lies the greatest propaganda weapon for the reawakening of a nation's dormant spirits of life.
For this, to be sure, from the child's primer down to the last newspaper, every theater and every movie house, every advertising pillar and every billboard, must be pressed into the service of this one great mission, until the timorous prayer of our present parlor patriots: 'Lord, make us free!' is transformed in the brain of the smallest boy into the burning plea: 'Almighty God, bless our arms when the time comes; be just as thou hast always been; judge now whether we be deserving of freedom; Lord, bless our battle!'
All this was neglected and nothing was done.
Who, then, will be surprised that our people is not as it should be and could be ? If the rest of the world sees in us only a stooge, an obsequious dog, who gratefully licks the hands that have just beaten him ?
Certainly our capacity for alliances today is injured by our people, but most of all by its governments. They in their corruption are to blame if after eight years of the most unlimited oppression so little will for freedom is present.
Much, therefore, as an active alliance policy is linked with the necessary evaluation of our people, the latter is equally dependent on the existence of a governmental power which does not want to be a handyman for foreign countries, not a taskmaster over its own strength, but a herald of the national conscience.
If our people has a state leadership which sees its mission in this light, six years will not pass before a bold Reich leadership in the field of foreign affairs will dispose of an equally bold will on the part of a people thirsting for freedom.
The second objection, the great difficulty of transforming hostile peoples into friendly allies, can be answered as follows:
The general anti-German psychosis cultivated in other countries by war propaganda will inevitably continue to exist until the German Reich, through the resurrection visible to all of a German will for self-preservation, achieves the character of a state which plays on the general European chessboard and with which it is possible to play. Only when government and people seem to provide absolute guaranty of a possible fitness for alliance can one or another power, out of parallel interest, think of reshaping public opinion by the effects of propaganda. This, too, naturally requires years of shrewd continuous work. The very need of this long period for altering the sentiments of a people necessitates caution in undertaking it; that is, no one will enter upon such an activity unless he is absolutely convinced of the value of such a labor and its fruits for the future. No one will want to change the spiritual orientation of a nation on the strength of the empty bragging of some more or less witty foreign minister, without possessing a tangible guaranty of the value of a new orientation. Otherwise this would lead to a complete shattering of public opinion. The most reliable certainty for the possibility of a future alliance with a state does not lie in the bombastic phrases of individual members of the government, but in the visible stability of a definite and seemingly expedient governmental tendency, and in a public opinion with an analogous orientation. The faith in this will be the firmer, the greater the visible activity of a governing power in the field of propagandist preparation and foundation of its work, and, conversely, the more unmistakably the will of public opinion is reflected in the governmental tendency.
A nation, then, will - in our situation - be regarded as fit for alliance, if government and public opinion with equal fanaticism proclaim and uphold the will to fight for freedom. This is the premise for beginning a reorientation in the public opinion of other nations, which on the basis of their knowledge are willing, in defense of their very own interests, to go a stretch of the way by the side of a partner who seems suitable to them - in other words, to conclude an alliance.
But there is one thing more to be said in this connection: Since the transformation of a certain spiritual attitude in a people requires hard work in itself, and at first will not be understood by many, it is a crime and a stupidity at once, to furnish these opposing elements with: weapons for their counter-efforts by mistakes of one's own.
It must be realized that it will necessarily take a certain time before a people has completely comprehended the inner purposes of a government, since explanations cannot be given regarding the final ultimate aims of certain preliminary political work, and one can only reckon either with the blind faith of the masses or the intuitive insight of the intellectually superior leader strata. But since in many people this clairvoyant political sixth sense is not present, and for political reasons explanations cannot be given, a part of the intellectual leader class will always turn against new tendencies which due to their incomprehensibility can easily be interpreted as mere experiments. Thus, the resistance of the anxious conservative elements is aroused.
For this reason more than any other, it becomes our highest duty to make sure that all serviceable weapons are wrested from the hands of such disturbers of mutual understanding, especially when, as in our case, we are dealing with nothing but the totally impracticable, purely fantastic babble of inflated parlor patriots and petit bourgeois café politicians. For on calm reflection no one will seriously deny that screaming for a new battle feet, for recovery of our colonies, etc., is in reality nothing but silly gossip' without so much as a thought of practical application. The way in which the senseless outpourings of these knights of the protest meeting, some of them innocent, some of them insane, but all of them in the silent service of our mortal enemies, are exploited in England, cannot be characterized as favorable to Germany. And so we wear ourselves out in harmful little demonstrations against God and the whole world and forget the first principle which is the premise for every success, to wit: Whatever you do, do it completely. By beefing against five or ten states, we neglect the concentration of all our will power and physical force for the thrust to the heart of our infamous enemy, and sacrifice the possibility of strengthening ourselves by an alliance for this conflict.
Here, too, lies a mission for the National Socialist movement. It must teach our people to look beyond trifles and see the biggest things, not to split up over irrelevant things, and never to forget that the aim for which we must fight today is the bare existence of our people, and the sole enemy which we must strike is and remains the power which is robbing us of this existence.
Some things may be profoundly painful to us. But this is far from being a ground for renouncing reason and bickering loudly and senselessly with the whole world instead of attacking the most mortal enemy in concentrated force.
Furthermore, the German people has no moral right to blame the rest of the world for its conduct as long as it has not called to account the criminals who sold and betrayed their whole country. Really, it is not serious for us to curse and protest against England, Italy, etc., from a distance, and leave the scoundrels at large who, in the pay of enemy war propaganda, took away our arms, broke our moral backbone, and auctioned off the crippled Reich for thirty pieces of silver.
The enemy does only what was to be predicted. We should learn from his conduct and his acts.
Anyone who is really unwilling to rise to the heights of such a conception should finally bear in mind that the only thing remaining in that case is renunciation, because then any alliance policy is impossible for the future. For if we cannot ally ourselves with England because she stole our colonies, or with Italy because she has the South Tyrol, with Poland and Czechoslovakia on their merits, then, aside from France - who incidentally did steal Alsace-Lorraine from us - there would remain no one else in Europe.
Whether this serves the German people is scarcely subject to doubt. The only thing that can remain in doubt is whether such an opinion is put forward by a simple dunce or by a shrewd adversary.
When it comes to leaders, I always believe the latter.
And so, in all human probability, a transformation of the psyche of individual peoples, who have hitherto been hostile but whose true future interests lie close to our own, may very well be possible if the inner strength of our state as well as our visible will for the preservation of our existence again make us seem worthy as an ally, and, further, if awkward movements of our own, or even criminal acts, do not furnish grist for the mill of the enemies of such a future tie with nations previously hostile to us.
The hardest to answer is the third objection.
Is it conceivable that the representatives of the real interests of the nations possible for alliance can put through their views in opposition to the will of the Jewish mortal enemy of free national states?
Can the forces of traditional British statesmanship, for example, break the devastating Jewish influence or not?
This question, as already stated, is very hard to answer. It depends on too many factors to permit of a conclusive judgement. One thing is certain in any case: In one country the present state power can be regarded as so stabilized and serves the interests of the country so absolutely that we can no longer speak of a really effective obstruction of political necessities by international Jewish forces.
The struggle that Fascist Italy is waging, though perhaps in the last analysis unconsciously (which I personally do not believe), against the three main weapons of the Jews is the best indication that, even though indirectly, the poison fangs of this supra-state power are being torn out. The prohibition of Masonic secret societies, the persecution of the supra-national press, as well as the continuous demolition of international Marxism, and, conversely, the steady reinforcement of the Fascist state conception, will in the course of the years cause the Italian government to serve the interests of the Italian people more and more, without regard for the hissing of the Jewish world hydra.
Things are more difficult in England. In this country of the 'freest democracy,¦ the Jew exerts an almost unlimited dictatorship indirectly through public opinion. And yet, even there an incessant struggle is taking place between the advocates of British state interests and the proponents of a Jewish world dictatorship.
How sharply these opposites often clash could be seen most clearly for the first time after the War in the different attitude toward the Japanese problem of the British government leaders on the one hand and of the press on the other.
Immediately after the end of the War, the old strain in the relations of America and Japan began to reappear. Of course, the great European powers could not remain indifferent to this new war danger. No ties of kinship can prevent a certain feeling of envious concern in England toward the growth of the American Union in all fields of international economic and power politics. The former colonial country, child of the great mother, seems to be growing into a new master of the world. It is understandable that England today re-examines her old alliances with anxious concern and British statesmen gaze with trepidation toward a period in which it will no longer be said:
'Britannia rules the waves !' But instead: 'The seas for the Union!'
It is harder to attack the gigantic American colossus of states with the enormous wealth of its virgin soil than the wedged-in German Reich. If the dice and the ultimate decision should ever roll, England, if left to her own resources would be doomed. And so they snatch eagerly at the yellow fist and cling to an alliance which, from the racial viewpoint, is perhaps unjustifiable, but from the viewpoint of state politics nevertheless represents the sole possibility of strengthening the British world position in the face of the up-surging American continent.
While the English state leadership, despite the common struggle on the European battlefields, could not resolve to relax its alliance with the Asiatic partner, the whole Jewish press fell on this alliance from behind.
How is it possible that the organs of a Northcliffe, until 1918 the faithful armor-bearer of the British struggle against the German Reich, should now break their loyalty and go their own ways?
The annihilation of Germany was not an English interest, but primarily a Jewish one, just as today a destruction of Japan serves British state interests less than it does the widespread desires of the leaders of the projected Jewish world empire. While England sweats to maintain her position in this world, the Jew organizes his attack for its conquest.
He already sees the present-day European states as will-less tools in his fist, whether indirectly through a so-called Western democracy, or in the form of direct domination by Jewish Bolshevism. But it is not only the Old World that he holds thus enmeshed, the same fate menaces the New. It is Jews who govern the stock exchange forces of the American Union. Every year makes them more and more the controlling masters of the producers in a nation of one hundred and twenty millions; only a single great man, Ford, to their fury, still maintains full independence.
With astute shrewdness they knead public opinion and make it into an instrument for their own future.
Already the greatest heads of Jewry see the approaching fulfillment of their testamentary prophecy about the great devouring of nations.
Within this great herd of denationalized colonial territories, a single independent state might still wreck the whole work at the eleventh hour. For a Bolshevistic world can exist only if it embraces everything.
If only a single state is preserved in its national strength and greatness, the world empire of Jewish satrapies, like every tyranny in this world, must succumb to the force of the national idea.
Now the Jew knows only too well that in his thousand years of adaptation he may have been able to undermine European peoples and train them to be raceless bastards, but that he would scarcely be in a position to subject an Asiatic national state like Japan to this fate. Today he may mimic the German and the Englishman, the American and Frenchman, but he lacks the bridges to the yellow Asiatic. And so he strives to break the Japanese national state with the strength of similar existing formations in order to rid himself of the dangerous adversary before the last state power is transformed in his hand into a despotism over defenseless beings.
In his millennial Jewish empire he dreads a Japanese national state, and, therefore, desires its annihilation even before establishing his own dictatorship.
And so he incites the nations against Japan as he once did against Germany, and this is what brings it about that, while British statesmen are still striving to build on the alliance with Japan, the British-Jewish press already demands struggle against the ally, and prepares the war of annihilation under the proclamation of democracy and under the battle-cry: Down with Japanese militarism and imperialism!
That is how insubordinate the Jew has become in England today.
And for this reason it is there that the struggle against the Jewish world menace will begin.
And again the National Socialist movement has the mightiest task to fulfill.
It must open the eyes of the people on the subject of foreign nations and must remind them again and again of the true enemy of our present-day world. In place of hatred against Aryans, from whom almost everything may separate us, but with whom we are bound by common blood or the great line of a kindred culture, it must call eternal wrath upon the head of the foul enemy of mankind as the real originator of our sufferings.
It must make certain that in our country, at least, the mortal enemy is recognized and that the fight against him becomes a gleaming symbol of brighter days, to show other nations the way to the salvation of an embattled Aryan humanity.
For the rest, may reason be our guide, may our will be our strength. May the sacred duty to act in this way give us determinations and above all may our faith protect us.